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RECENT DECISIONS
SALES-WARRANTY-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MER-
CHANTABILITY.-Plaintiff, purchaser of a gallon of "Globe Quick-Dry
Fluid for Dry Cleaning", sued to recover damages from defendant de-
partment store for illness occasioned by the use of the fluid, alleging
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The container
bore the legend, "The fluid contains ingredients which produce vapors,
which if inhaled in large amounts may cause disconifort and distress"
and that "with reasonable care it can be used with absolute safety".
The directions instructed the purchaser to use the fluid only out-of-
doors or in a room well ventilated by a cross draft. Plaintiff, who
had read these instructions, used the fluid in a small room in which
there was no cross ventilation, and was made sick by the fumes. Upon
appeal by the defendant from an affirmance of a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, held, reversed. "We think the evidence conclusively
shows that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care in the use of the
fluid and that this default was an essential cause of her illness."
Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N. Y. 146, 18 N. E. (2d)
11 (1938). 1
At early common law the doctrine of caveat emptor placed the
risk of the possibility of a defect on the vendee in the absence of an
express warranty. The creation by the law of the doctrine of implied
warranties shifted the burden to the shoulders of the vendor because
of his more intimate knowledge of the article.2 Early suits for breach
of warranty sounded in tort and were in the nature of trespass on the
case sounding in deceit; but the action later evolved into assumpsit.3
Hence today, the general rule is that in actions for breach of warranty
there must be privity of contract. 4 Although we have come to re-
gard warranty as an action in contract, a seller's liability may never-
'Whether defendant could be held under §§ 1360 and 1364 of the N. Y.
EDUCATION LAW and § 1743 of the PENAL LAW (the twenty four grains of
carbon tetrachloride in the preparation being destructive to human life) was not
passed upon by the court although plaintiff contended that this rendered the
goods unmarketable as a matter of law.
2 "An implied warranty in the case of a sale of an article is an obligation
imposed by law." Craig v. Pellet, 209 Ill. App. 368 (1918). "It is a child of
the law. * * * It [the law] Writes it, by implication, into the contract which the
parties have made." Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927).
That the doctrine of caveat emptor precluded the existence of implied war-
ranties, see WHITNEY, SALES (2d ed. 1934) § 170. Today, implied warranties are
enumerated under N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96, or under a corresponding sec-
tion of a similar statute in each of the other states.
' The first reported case allowing recovery for a breach of warranty in an
action on the contract was Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18 (Eng. 1778); 8
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 70.
4Statutory warranties in sales of goods run in favor of immediate pur-
chasers only. Hazelton v. First Nat. Stores, 88 N. H. 409, 190 Atl. 280 (1937).
For exceptions see Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. (2d) 597
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Where the action is for negligence and not for breach of
contract privity of contract is not necessary. Ritchie v. Sheffield Farms Co.,
Inc., 129 Misc. 765, 222 N. Y. Supp. 724 (1927).
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theless sound in tort as well as in contract. 5 The latest implied war-
ranty to be recognized is the implied warranty of merchantability. 6
To meet this warranty the merchandise must be at least of minimum
qu!ality and goodness, and reasonably fit for the general purpose for
which it is to be used.7 This warranty of merchantability has been
extended to include a warranty of safety in the use of the article but
only in those cases in which the product has been used in the pre-
scribed way, or where the use to which the product was to be put
was made known to the vendor.8 This extension can never be im-
plied where the product has been abused. The use of the product in
the instant case, without regard to the directions on the label, consti-
tuted such an abuse.
It is possible by the use of appropriate words, or by the making
of an inconsistent expressed warranty, or by examination of the goods,
5 Thus where the rule as to implied warranty in the sale of beverages in
bottles does not apply, as in Tennessee, any recovery must be based on negli-
gence. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Rowland, 16 Tenn. App. 184, 66 S. W. (2d)
272 (1932). In Schuler v. Union News Co., - Mass. -, 4 N. E. (2d) 465
(1936), the court said: "The third count for breach of warranty was properly
included in an action of tort. An action of tort as well as an action of contract
may be maintained upon a false warranty. This is definitely laid down by
Chief Justice Shaw in Norton v. Doherty, 3 Gray 272 (Mass. 1855), where ajudgment for the defendant in such an action of tort was held to bar a later
action of contract upon the same warranty."
' Implied warranties of title were earliest recognized, and later warranties
of fitness for a disclosed purpose were similarly implied. Medina v. Stoughton,
1 Salk. 210, 1 Ld. Ray. 593 (Eng. 1700) ; Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533 (Eng.
1829).
"At least of minimum quality and goodness", Howard v. Hoey, 23 Wend.
350, 351 (N. Y. 1840). "A good enough delivery to pass generally under that
description after full examination * * * of passing grade for such goods."
McNeil & Higgins v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co., 274 Fed. 397, 399 (S. D. N. Y.
1921). "Free from latent defects that render it unmerchantable", Carlton v.
Lombard, 149 N. Y. 137, 153, 43 N. E. 422 (1896).
The lower court in the instant case charged that "the term merchantable,
while frequently used as synonymous with saleable, may be given a broader
meaning to include adaptability to the use to which the merchandise is to be put.
If an article cannot be used in the light of the directions given for its use and
in the exercise of reasonable care without resulting in serious consequences to
the person using it, that article is not of merchantable quality." To the same
effect is Kelvinator Sales v. Quibbin, 234 App. Div. 96, 97, 254 N. Y. Supp. 123
(1st Dept. 1931) : "The term merchantable, while frequently used as synony-
mous with saleable, may be given a broader connotation to include adaptability
to the immediate use to which it is to be put." See WHITNEY, SALES, op. Cit,
mupra note 2, § 172; also WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1934) § 235.
' Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills (1936 A. C. Australia 85) 105 A. L.
R. 1483, where purchaser of undergarment who contracted a skin disease from
wearing it recovered from the retailer on the ground of implied warranty of
merchantability under § 14 of the Sales of Goods Act of South Australia, which
is almost identical with § 96 of the Personal Property Law of this state. Cf.
Crandall v. Stop & Shop, 288 Ill. App. 543, 6 N. E. (2d) 685 (1937), where
the implied warranty would not be extended to render the retailer liable for
injuries caused by the opening of a glass container of fruit preserves.
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or by disclaimer, to limit or nullify an implied warranty.9 In so
doing, however, one must consider questions of notice, fraud, public
policy, and statutory requirements, as well as the tendency of the
courts to construe such provisions either strictly or liberally.1 ° In
the instant case the caution on the container formed part of the con-
tract, and defendant's implied warranty was conditioned upon the com-
pliance of the plaintiff with the legend.1 The failure of the plaintiff
to comply with this portion of the contract was the direct and proxi-
mate cause of her injury.1 2 The defense of lack of due care is, in this
type of case, as consistent with an action for breach of contract as
with an action in tort for negligence.' 3 The act of the plaintiff in the
instant case was wilful; had the harm been caused by accident a dif-
ferent conclusion might have been reached.' 4 But if one by his vol-
I N. Y. Pms PROP. LAW § 152, "Where any right, duty or liability would
arise under a contract or sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or
varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or
by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract of sale."
Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Law (identical with N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW§ 152) is declaratory of the common law. Christian Mills, Inc. v. Brethold
Stern Flour Cc., 247 Ill. App. 1 (1927). In Ryan v. Progressive Grocery
Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 394, 175 N. E. 105 (1931), Cardozo, J., said: "It [the
rule] may even be different, though the purchase is by description, if the goods
are subject to inspection and the defects are of such a nature that inspection
will reveal them." Also see WLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 239a.
"A disclaimer is not likely to be upheld if printed where the vendee is not
likely to see it. Amzi Godden Seed Co. v. Smith, 185 Ala. 246, 64 So. 100
(1913). A disclaimer will be set aside on the ground of fraud. Davis v.
Joyner, 27 Ga. App. 132, 107 S. E. 551 (1921). In S. F. Bowser v. McCormack,
230 App. Div. 303, 243 N. Y. Supp. 442 (4th Dept. 1930), a strict construction
was adopted by the court.
" In Calhoon v. Brinker, 17 Ohio Dec. 705 (1907), the court recognized the
printed matter on a package of seeds as part of the contract between the buyer
and the seller. The directions on the label were of primary importance in
determining the liability in the cases of Willson v. Faxon, 122 N. Y. Supp. 783,
138 App. Div. 359 (4th Dept. 1910), and Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga.
457, 10 S. E. 118 (1889). See Note (1937) 22 WAsH. U. L. Q. 536.
Campbell v. Stamper Drug Co., 85 Colo. 508, 277 Pac. 770 (1929) (failure
to read the label was not negligence as a matter of law) ; Hartman v. Berlin &
Jones Envelope Co., 71 Misc. 30, 127 N.oY. Supp. 187 (1911) ("Whether an
accident was proximately caused by negligence is determined by whether the
accident would have happened without such negligence and whether the accident
and the resultant injury was reasonably to be foreseen").
' Because of the similarity between an action in contract for breach of
warranty and an action in tort for negligence the courts have often found it
necessary to distinguish between them. Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205
App. Div. 648, 200 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1st Dept. 1923); Abounader v. Stroh-
meyer, etc. Co., 217 App. Div. 43, 215 N. Y. Supp. 702 (4th Dept. 1926);
Shepard v. Beck, 131 Misc. 164, 255 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1927); Jaroniec v.
Hasselbarth, Inc., 223 App. Div. 182, 228 N. Y. Supp. 302 (3d Dept. 1928);
Cohen v. Dugan Bros., Inc., 132 Misc. 896, 230 N. Y. Supp. 743 (1928); Ireland
v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371 (1922); Pelletier v.
Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925); Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream
Co., 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl. 884 (1929).
',As in the case of Egan v. Horn and Macy, N. Y. -L. J., Nov. 8, 1935,
where the death of the plaintiffs iitestate caused by the fumes of a gallon of
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untary act, places himself in a position of danger, he cannot recover
for the resultant injury. The rule of contracts that the law will not
allow the plaintiff to take advantage of his own default to the detri-
ment of the innocent defendant would be applied. The fundamental
basis of a warranty is the reliance by the buyer on the superior knowl-
edge of the seller; thus where both parties have the same knowledge
the law does not imply a warranty. Here the dangerous properties
of the fluid were made known to the plaintiff. It was because of this
that the plaintiff had no remedy.' 5
H. P. M.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-INJUNcTION-TRADE NAMES-"SHRED-
DED WHIEAT".-The complainant, National Biscuit Co., sought to en-
join the defendant, Kellogg Co., from manufacturing shredded wheat
biscuits in a pillow-shaped form and from selling them under the name
of "Shredded Wheat". The complainant claimed the exclusive right
to make shredded wheat biscuits in a pillow-shaped form, and the ex-
clusive right to designate them by the trade name "Shredded Wheat".
The defendant was accused of unfair competition on the ground that
its use of the form and the trade name was, allegedly, calculated to
"pass off" the defendant's goods for those of the complainant. It
was shown that although the basic patent for the manufacture of
shredded wheat by the Shredded Wheat Co.' had expired in 1912,
the Kellogg Co. did not compete with the Shredded Wheat Co. until
1927, after the said company had expended over seventeen million
dollars in creating a great demand for its product. However, in com-
peting for the same market in which the complain nt sold its goods,
the defendant used all reasonable means to prevent the public from
confusing the source of the goods. The standard Kellogg cartons
were strikingly dissimilar in size, form and color from the cartons
of the complainant. They were distinctively labeled "Kellogg Shred-
ded Whole Wheat Biscuit" so as to strike the eye of even an unwary
purchaser as being a Kellogg product. The defendant's cartons con-
cleaning fluid which had been spilled on the floor. Judgment was given for the
plaintiff on the ground that the defendants were chargeable with negligence in
marketing into homes such quantities of a dangerous fluid. Unanimously
affirmed without opinion, 248 App. Div. 697 (1st Dept. 1936).
The basis of an implied warranty is justifiable reliance on judgment and
skill of the warrantor, as shown by the particular circumstances. Ford v.
Waldorf System, - R. I. -, 188 At. 633 (1936). "The purpose and use of
the implied warranty is to promote high standards in business and to discourage
sharp dealings. It rests upon the principle that honesty is the best policy and
contemplates business transactions in which both parties may profit. Bekkevold
v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927).
'To whose business and goodwill the complainant had succeeded in 1930.
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